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LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY POWER
By EDWARD A. HOGAN *
Senators, Lawyers, Republicans, Newspapermen-and probably rich
men, poor men, beggarmen and thieves are, within their own organizations,
divided in their opinion on the Bricker amendment.' The author of this paper
will not undertake to argue as to which part of which group is wrong. It is,
however, quite clear that there are some doctors, lawyers, merchants and
chiefs who have not had an opportunity to do research in some of the ob-
scure volumes that contain the history of the treaty power, as found in article
II, section 2, of the United States Constitution. To those who are willing to
withhold judgment until the facts are before them, this essay on the historical
background of the proposed Bricker amendment is offered. This presentation
will be made on a non-partisan basis. If this information, so presented leads
a few Americans to make a reasonable decision, one way or the other, on
this critical question, this article will serve a useful purpose.
By a vote of 60 in favor and 31 opposed, the United States Senate on
February 26, 1954 failed, by one vote, to give the required consent of two-
thirds of the members present for submission of a proposed constitutional
amendment to the states for approval. The proponents have not accepted this
vote as final. Except for some parliamentary maneuvering which delayed
the final count, the original count of 60 to 30 gave the necessary consent--
but in the interim one dissenter entered the Senate chamber and his single
vote reversed the original authorization. The proponents assert that they are
determined to push for resubmission.
An amendment to the Federal Constitution is the business of all of the
people of the United States in their capacity as citizens, not merely as mem-
bers of socially or politically organized groups. The Bricker amendment pro-
poses to place restrictions on the treaty-making power of the United States
and to restrict the President in the use of the executive agreement as a substi-
tute for the use of the treaty-making power. To facilitate independent decision,
a comprehensive coverage of basic data will be made.
There are two provisions of the Federal Constitution which are di-
rectly in point:
1. Article II, Section 2-dealing with the power of the President" . . .
He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur . . . "
2. Article VI, paragraph 2, the so-called Supremacy Clause- . . .
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
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A.B. 1930, LL.B. Boston College, 1934; LL.M. Harvard University, 1935: LL.D. St. Mary's College,
1941. Formerly Professor of Law and Dean of University of San Francisco Law School; Member
of the Massachusetts Bar.
'S.J. RES. 1 and SEN. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding."
There is involved indirectly another provision of the Federal Constitu-
tion, article I, section 10, which places a prohibition upon the separate
states in the making of treaties. "No state shall, without the consent of Con-
gress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact, with another state, or
with a Foreign Power. .... "
These provisions of the United States Constitution are all part of the
original document, as adopted in 1789. The question comes, and quite nat-
urally so, as to why the sudden and powerful demand for a change in these
ancient parts of the United States Constitution. A short answer, and therefore
not a completely adequate answer, may be found in the adoption, in 1945,
of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco and in the international
agreements that are emerging out of the United Nations Charter. Specifically,
objection has been strong to the United Nations Genocide Convention' as
well as to the Covenant on Human Rights.' Conceding that this is only a
partial explanation of the movement to amend the Constitution, it will serve
as a starting point for a more lengthy explanation. The Genocide Conven-
tion, which has been proposed to, but has not yet been ratified by, the
United States Senate has a provision for an International Criminal Court,
with no limitation on venue and forbids trial by jury.' The Covenant on Hu-
man Rights, likewise signed by the United States but not yet ratified by the
Senate, permits restrictions on freedom of speech, press and assembly as are
necessary to protect public safety, which may turn into a form of peacetime
censorship.5 Thus, the proponents of the Bricker amendment anticipate that
the due execution of this multi-lateral treaty may violate the constitutional
guarantees of the First Amendment to the Constitution with its guarantees of
freedom of speech, press and assembly; the Fourth Amendment and its
guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure; the Fifth Amendment
with its guarantees of jury trial and due process; and the Sixth Amendment
with the guarantees of trial in the vicinage, confrontation with witnesses,
and assistance of counsel.
219 bEP'T. STATE BULL. 756 (1948) Submitted to the Senate by the President, June 16, 1949;
21 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 844 (1949). See, McDougal and Arens, The Genocide Convention and the
Constitution, 3 VAND. L.R. 683 (1950). See, 37 A.B.A.J. 932 (1951); Parker, An International
Criminal Court: The Case for its Adoption, 38 A.B.AJ. 641 (1952) ; Finch: The Case against its
Adoption, 38 A.B.A.J. 644 (.1952).
'6 UNITED NATIONS BULL. 6-8 (1949) ; 24 DEP'T. OF STATE BULL. 1008 ff. (1951).
'CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE ART. 6; RE-
PORT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, sitting at Geneva 'une 5-July 29, 1950.
'CONVENTION ON NEWS AND RIGHT OF CORRECTION Art. 7. See, Holman, CONVENTION ON FREE-
DOM OF INFORMATION, 37 A.B.A.J. 567 (1951) ; COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS Art. 13, 14, 15, 16.
U. N. YEARBOOK, 564-67 (1948-49).
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These problems are the very modern problems which arise out of the
use of the treaty power. These problems are modern adaptations of basic
problems that have confronted our government from the time that the military
forces of Great Britain laid down their arms in the American Revolution.6
Perhaps, at the outset, a definition of terms will clarify some of the
problems which the proponents of the Bricker amendment are trying to solve.
"Treaty" is a term of broad and comprehensive meaning.' Normally, it is a
compact entered into by two or more independent sovereigns. "Treaty" as
the word appears in the Federal Constitution probably has a more restricted
meaning. Complications of meaning will be avoided by restricting the mean-
ing to the use made in article II, section 2: "He shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur; ... " The language of the Bricker
amendment indicates, in sections 1, 2 and 3, that the word "Treaty" is used
in this formal sense.
Reference is made in section 3 to "Executive and other Agreements"
which require some additional definition. "Executive Agreement"' means an
international agreement entered into by our Chief Executive, without refer-
ence either to the Senate or to both houses of Congress. It is reasonable to
assume that the term "Executive Agreement" includes such matters as the
Litvinoff Assignments,9 Yalta and Potsdam." "Other Agreements" refer
to Executive implementation of acts of Congress, authorized under previous
legislation, such as that found in the 1934 Amendment" to the Tariff Act of
1930, which authorized the President, within limitations, to enter into foreign
trade agreements.' 2 With these definitions in mind, consider the express pro-
visions of the Bricker amendment, as proposed by the Judiciary Committee
of the U. S. Senate on June 15, 1953."3
"1. A Provision of a Treaty Which Conflicts with this Constitution
Shall Not Be of Any Force or Effect."
Briefly, the points of a conflict, in addition to those referred to in the
Covenant of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention are those that
arose under the 18th, or Prohibition Amendment, and those which have
arisen under the 10th, or Rights Reserved to the States, Amendment.
'FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 19 et seq. (rev. ed. 1937) ; 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES
189 (2d ed. 1876).
'Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931).
'McCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 38 (1941) ; 19 Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. 513 (1890);
John Bassett Moore, 20 POL. SCI. Q. 385 (1905).9U. S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
"°See 98 Cong. Rec. 926 (Feb. 7, 1952).
1148 STAT. 943 (1934).
"See Altman and Co. v. U. S., 224 U.S. 583, 600 (1912).
"SEN. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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"Section 2. A Treaty Shall Become Effective as Internal Law in the
United States Only Through Legislation Which Would Be Valid in the Ab-
sence of Treaty."
The area of conflict here arises out of the unique rule in regard to
treaties which is followed in the United States. If such is the intention of the
contracting parties, in the United States a treaty is said to be "self executing,"
that is, the treaty becomes law binding on the separate states of the United
States as domestic law, without the enactment of concurring legislation in
any of the states of the United States. Thus, through the exercise of the
treaty-making power, the Chief Executive and two-thirds of the Senators
voting override established policies of particular states. 4 The best known
litigation concerning the effect of treaties has concerned the inheritance to
land contrary to state real property law,'5 the right of an alien to engage in
pawnbroking despite a local ordinance,'" the right of an alien to pay no
more inheritance tax than a national of the United States,'" as well as the
right to go duck hunting.'" The Tenth Amendment, reserving to the states
powers not otherwise delegated to th e federal government, has been invoked
unsuccessfully in each of these cases. If this amendment becomes law, a
treaty will no longer be self executing but the treaty may become the source
of domestic law only to the extent that each state of the United States agrees
to change any of its internal policies which are in conflict with the treaty.
"3. Congress Shall Have the Power to Regulate All Executive and
Other Agreements with Any Foreign Power or International Organization.
All Such Agreements Shall Be Subject to the Limitations Imposed on Treaties
by This Article."
So far as "other agreements" are involved, this proposal adds nothing.
Such agreements are now founded upon congressional action-as was evi-
denced in the foreign trade agreements made under the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended in 1934, and implemented quite extensively in 1947.
The critical question then comes on "Executive Agreements," which are
made independently of legislative action. This proposed amendment puts
into the Congress a power to regulate actions of the executive in an area
where several of his predecessors felt extremely free. Like "treaties" these
agreements, under the Bricker amendment, will not be "self-executing" but
will be subject to added control of the separate states if the subject matter of
the treaty conflicts with existing state laws. Executive agreements started
1
'Art. II, § 2; Art. VI, 2.
"Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (U.S. 1812) ; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
1 Wheat. 304 (U.S. 1816).
"
6Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
"Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
"Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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with President Washington who made postal agreements with Canada, 9
followed by a limitation on Naval tonnage on the Great Lakes, 0 and there-
after, like Topsy "just growed." There is no specific authority in the Federal
Constitution for their use.
"4. The Congress Shall Have the Power to Enforce This Article by
Appropriate Legislation."
This sentence, which appears to confer powers of sanction on Congress
to give effect to the three prior provisions has not, as yet, become the subject
of controversy.
The so-called Bricker amendment is only one of several proposed amend-
ments offered in the last few years in this matter of the treaty making power
of the United States. Senator Knowland of California has offered a proposed
amendment. 2' Senator George has proposed another amendment.22 The Ameri-
can Bar Association has offered a proposed amendment.2" The Legislature
of California, on June 4, 1951, requested that an amendment be offered. 4
In 1952, 59 Senators joined in proposing the Bricker amendment. In 1953,
64 U. S. Senators have joined in sponsoring the Bricker amendment. The
American Bar Association is deeply split on this issue but the majority, under
the leadership of past president Frank Holman of Seattle, are in favor of
something similar to the Bricker amendment.25
The principal attack made by Senator Bricker, and by those of a like
mind, on the existing provisions of the United States Constitution is directed
at article VI, or the so-called Supremacy Clause. A treaty is a compact made
between two or more independent nations. The subject matter of the treaty
ordinarily will affect these nations in their dealings with each other. 26 Gen-
erally speaking, it is supposed that a treaty will cover matters described as
international or external affairs as distinguished from the domestic or in-
ternal concerns of the nations involved. It is not at all normal for a treaty to
be used as the basis of domestic or internal regulation of a country's affairs.
The self-executing feature of a treaty, made under the sixth article of
the Constitution of the United States, is unique in the world of nations.27
1I STAT. 239 (1792) ; MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 38 (1941). See U.S.
News and World Report, Feb. 5, 1954, p. 33, showing, for the period 1789-1939, 800 Treaties and
1200 published Executive Agreements; for the period 1939-1954, 200 Treaties, 1400 published Ex-
ecutive Agreements; and a statement attributed to Secretary of State Dulles that unpublished Execu-
tive Agreements have run into thousands since World War II.
202 MILLER, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 645 (1931).
2199 Cong. Rec. 9757 (July 22, 1953).
-100 Cong. Rec. 821 (Jan. 27, 1954).
3S. J. RES. 43, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
-97 Cong. Rec. 6183 (June 4, 1951).
"See A.B.A. REPORT OF THE SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAw, Proceedings,
Boston, Massachusetts, 1953.
-"See note 7 supra.
"See Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario and others. [1937] A.C. 326.
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You will recall that article VI provides that a treaty, made under the au-
thority of the Constitution, becomes the supreme law of the land, and the
judges of all of the states are bound by its provisions, in spite of any state laws
to the contrary. So far as diligent research has revealed, no other nation in
the world repeals inconsistent domestic laws simply by the subsequent use of
the treaty making power. But the treaty power of the United States is self-
executing in that it repeals inconsistent state laws, without separate or inde-
pendent action on the part of the various legislatures which had previously
enacted these contrary laws. Other nations require separate legislative action
to implement a treaty made under international law before the treaty becomes
the source of domestic law.
To explain this unique practice of making United States treaties self-
executing, it is necessary to look into the history of our country during the
period between the American Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution
in 1789. It is indeed elementary for us to say that in 1776 the independence
of the separate states was considered to be a matter of great importance. The
ill-fated alliance under the Articles of Confederation verifies our prior ele-
mentary statement. The need for strength in a federal government, in areas
properly within the sphere of the federal government, slowly becomes ap-
parent under the experiences of Confederation as distinguished from Union.28
In the area of treaty making there was an added complication. An im-
portant treaty but not the only treaty, then in contemplation, was the Treaty
of Peace with Britain. The opposition to Britain and to all it represented to
victorious colonists, is easily understood. Punishment of Tories and denial
of equal rights to Englishmen fitted the spirit of the times. A treaty with
Britain was no easy matter for those charged with the duty of accomplishing
it.2" The British forts at Buffalo and Detroit'had not been disarmed.
Many of the states, particularly the powerful State of Virginia, refused
to permit its courts to hear the claims of British creditors for the payment of
their just debts from American debtors. Likewise, Virginia placed a prohibi.
tion on the inheritance of Virginia land by heirs who had not renounced
their allegiance to the Crown. The British were not favorably disposed to-
ward a treaty which contained no protection for the rights of creditors and
heirs who were subjects of the Crown. There is much historical authority for
the proposition that the Supremacy Clause in article VI was incorporated
into the U. S. Constitution to override anti-foreign heir state laws which were
a definite obstacle to the treaty with Britain. After the treaty with Britain 0
was formally approved, the State of Virginia continued to refuse the claims
of English heirs and English creditors. Early cases in the Supreme Court of
2 8 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 19, 164, 244-245, 292-293 (rev. ed. 1937).
2931 JOURNALS OF THE CONT. CoNG. 781, 874 (1786).
808 STAT. 80 (1783).
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the United States upheld the Supremacy Clause, and in the case of Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee,"' the State of Virginia was ordered to abandon its own laws
and to award Virginia land to an English heir of Lord Fairfax, and in Ware
v. Hylton 2 the claim of an English creditor was ordered satisfied in spite of
the existing law in the State of Virginia. There is good reason to suppose
that the Treaty would not have been brought about in the absence of the
Supremacy Clause of article VI with its implied protection for English heirs
and creditors."3
Whether or not the people of the United States wish to discard article
VI because its original purpose was fulfilled, on the adoption of the Treaty,
is a political question on which no opinion is ventured. Whether subsequent
amendments to the United States Constitution, starting with Amendment I,
and running through the Bill of Rights, or the first ten, the second ten and
then on, are outside the provisions of article VI has been argued seriously
by eminent scholars. 4 Professor Sutherland says:
"A reasonable argument can be made from the circumstances surround-
ing the adoption of the Supremacy Clause that original constitutional limi-
tations intended for the protection of the citizen cannot be abrogated by
treaty, for civil liberties are entirely outside the reason for the Supremacy
Clause, the desire to protect British claims to land and credits. ' 3'
Perhaps additional enlightenment on this question may come about by
a consideration of a few cases in which the supremacy of the federal govern-
ment over separate states has been asserted through the treaty power.
In 1782, when an official church was within the favor of certain states, a
treaty with the Netherlands guaranteed freedom of worship to their subjects.36
During the 19th century, inheritance rights for foreigners, similar to
those granted the British, were conferred by treaty on Swiss subjects"1 and
on French subjects. 38 State laws forbidding an alien from acquiring an inter-
est in land located within particular states thus were superseded by the exer-
cise of Federal Treaty Power.
In 1884, an important but no doubt an obvious qualification was read
into article II, section 2, on treaty powers. This qualification arose out of
what is known as the "Head Money" cases.39 Congress imposed a head tax of
50 cents per immigrant on the owners of vessels bringing immigrants into
1 Wheat. 304 (U.S. 1816).
33 Dall. 199 (U.S. 1796).
"See note 29 supra.
"Chafee, Federal and State Powers Under the U.N. Covenant on Human Rights, 1951 Wisc.
LR. 389, 623.
"65 HARv. L.R. 1305, 1318 (1952).
"8 STAT. 32 (1782).
"Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
"Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 (U.S. 1817).
"112 U.S. 580 (1884). See also Chae Chan Ping v. U. S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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the United States. It was alleged that this Head Tax Act of Congress violated
earlier treaties between the United States and some foreign governments. But
the Supreme Court pointed out that a treaty has no superiority over an act
of Congress-instead it is equal to an act of Congress. Thus, a later act of
Congress will modify or repeal an earlier treaty on the same subject. It is in
this power of Congress to amend or repeal treaties by regular legislative ac-
tivity that the opponents of the Bricker amendment take such comfort. The
opponents of the Bricker amendment say, quite accurately, that a bad treaty
or any treaty may be repealed by a subsequent act of Congress. Whether
or not possible subsequent action by Congress is an adequate safeguard
against Treaties which threaten the fundamental rights of Americans is again
a political question on which no opinion is ventured. But, it must be obvious
that the power of executive veto4 may be used to thwart the wishes of a bare
majority.
There is one case,' today considered to be the classic case on the subject
which pretty well points up the issue of an invasion of a state's rights through
the use of the federal treaty power. The case is known as Missouri v. Hol-
land.41 It is possible to develop the problem through a statement of the facts.
The federal government long had been interested in conserving the
supply of ducks. Wildlife, from time immemorial, has been considered to be
the property of the citizens of the states in which it is found. The state as
parens patriae has a duty to protect wildlife for the benefit of its own citizens
to the exclusion of the citizens of other states.
Congress attempted by statute, to regulate the hunting of ducks. Con-
gressional regulation and regulation by mid-western' states came into con-
filict. Arkansas and Kansas objected to federal interference in an area which
inhabitants of these states classified under the special heading of states rights.
Litigation definitely established that there was no ordinary federal power,
delegated by the states to the federal government, which took away from the
states the exclusive right to the control of wildlife.4 The Tenth Amendment
reserved such power to the states. Thus, it appeared that the federal govern-
ment was blocked in its bold attempt at bird control. Then a hyper-active
legal mind thought of the treaty power.
The United States and Great Britain, acting as the Mother Nation of
Canada, entered into a treaty to protect migratory ducks flying between the
United States and Canada. 8 The United States Supreme Court upheld the
right of the federal government to exercise control under the treaty power,
after the federal government had failed to demonstrate a grant of regulatory
"U. S. CONsT. Art. 1, § 7.
"See note 18 supra.
"U. S. v. Shauver, 214 Fed. (E.D. Ark. 1914) ; U. S. v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan.
1915) ; State v. McCullagh, 96 Kan. 786, 153 Pac. 557 (1915).
"40 STAT. 755 (1918).
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power in any other part of the Federal Constitution. Missouri and other
states, thereby lost their traditional right to create an open season on ducks.
The decision of Missouri v. Holland makes clear that there is no subject, of
whatever nature, that may not become the concern of the United States and
some other country. Given international interest in any activity, even if it
has been thought previously to be the subject only of local concern, there is
no longer an obstacle to federal action, found in the Tenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. The Tenth Amendment once was thought to be a com-
plete safeguard of the rights of the states and the people of the states by its
provisions that "powers not delegated to the United States . . .are reserved
to the states."
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court said:
"The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be
found in the constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by
some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.
We must decide what this country has become in deciding what that amend-
ment has reserved."144
Quite unconsciously perhaps, the Holmes decision makes the Bill of
Rights subject to the Supremacy Clause provisions of article VI.
The case of Missouri v. Holland is dated 1920. There had been a gap
of more than one hundred years between the time in which a state was denied
the right to control inheritance to its own land or to exclude foreign creditors
from the assets of its citizen debtors to a denial of the right of a state to pre-
serve wildlife for the benefit of its citizens. The subsequent adoption of the
Bill of Rights following the Supremacy Clause, had no significance to Mr
Justice Holmes or to those who have followed his line of thinking in cases
involving the treaty power and international agreements. Actually, the fears
of those who favor home rule over federal rule were well established by the
case of Missouri v. Holland 25 years before the United Nations Charter. The
United Nations Charter with its implications merely added the International
Isolationists to States Rightists who feel that in the making of a treaty there
is something more to fear than fear itself.
The fears of the State Rightists are increased by the opinions of our
courts, not necessarily final decisions, or even majority opinions, which sug-
gest that the United Nations Charter is a treaty which overrides state laws
against miscegenous marriages, restrictive race covenants and local labor
regulations. In California, an intermediate appellate court used the United
Nations Charter as the ratio decidendi to overthrow the California prohibition
against the acquisition to land by Japanese.45 Two justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States expressed similar thoughts in the Oyama,46 or
"Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
"'Sei Fujii v. State of California, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal.App. 1950).
"Black, J., and Murphy, J., concurring in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50, 673 (1948).
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earlier California case involving land statutes. The Supreme Court of the
State reached the same result in the same (Fujidl) case but put its decision
on our own American Covenant of Human Rights-namely, the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution." The Supreme Court of the United
States was not asked to rule on the question. There is good reason to suppose
that the decision of the intermediate appellate court in the Fuifi case was a
strong factor in influencing the California Legislature to make the request
that something similar to the Bricker amendment be added to the Federal
Constitution.4" This statement is made without suggesting approval or dis-
approval of either decision of the California appellate courts. This essay is
not a vehicle to express opinions but to give the background of the movement
in favor of the Bricker amendment.
Little known, but certainly most extraordinary, was the use of the treaty
power, to override an express provision of the Federal Constitution. President
Calvin Coolidge, in 1924, entered into a treaty with Great Britain which per-
mitted British vessels to enter the United States with a supply of intoxicating
liquors kept under seal, contrary to the provisions of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment.49 Prior legal action by Cunard Steamship Company against Andrew
Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury,"0 had denied to the British the right to
make even such limited importations of intoxicating beverages. Determined
attempts by American mariners to litigate the question of the supremacy of a
treaty over an express constitutional provision were frustrated in the lower
federal courts.51
Many no doubt, remember the steel strike and the attempted seizure of
the steel industry by the President of the United States. His purported au-
thority to make this seizure was founded upon United Nations commitments
by which he felt bound to contribute the military and industrial might of the
United States in support of United Nations activity. The former Chief Justice
of the United States, in a vigorous dissent to the majority opinion,52 which
held that the President exceeded his power in seizing the steel plants in the
name of the United States, but without congressional authorization so to do,
argued that the President received his authority to seize the steel industry
under international arrangements to which he had become a party and under
which he was acting at the time of his seizure. The belief of the Chief Ex-
ecutive that international commitments, of which the American people were
not definitely aware, obligated him to seize any part of American industry
provided a shock to many.
"'38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1923).
4897 Cong. Rec. 6186 (June 4, 1951).
"'43 STAT. 1761 (1924).5 0Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923).5 1Milliken v. Stone, 16 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1927).
52Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1951)
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This case brings to light the need to speak of another form of interna-
tional activity by the United States which is causing great concern to the
Isolationists. This may, or may not, involve secret commitments. Most simply,
this may be called the "Executive Agreement."
The foundation for the discussion of executive agreements is discovered
in the dicta of Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Curtiss-Wright case.53 By a joint
resolution, Congress authorized the President under given circumstances, to
place an embargo on instruments of war. By executive decree, the President
forbade the exportation of military airplanes to Bolivia during the course of
the Chaco dispute. Curtiss-Wright made plans to export such airplanes, and
were indicted for conspiracy to violate the law. In the litigation surrounding
this charge, Curtiss-Wright challenged the power of the executive to make
laws on powers so indefinitely granted to him by Congress. Mr. Justice Suth-
erland, speaking for the court, upheld the right of the President in this case,
and went on to say, by way of dicta, that in international affairs the Presi-
dent had full powers to act without regard to any of the provisions of the
Federal Constitution, likening him to a legally unfettered King dealing as
an equal with any other sovereign. The suggestion that an American president
is above the Constitution is too shocking for many Americans to accept, in-
cluding President Eisenhower who has written, on January 26, 1954, to
Senator Knowland giving his approval to a plan to make the treaty power
subject to the Federal Constitution.
The language of the decision in Curtiss-Wright combined with the
language of two cases involving clear problems of the right of the President
by executive agreement, to avoid the terms of the Tenth Amendment, are
altogether a source of considerable concern to those who question the right
of any executive to use a substitute for the formal treaty requiring Senate
approval.
United States v. Pink54 and United States v. Belmont55 involved some-
what similar problems. The President reversed an earlier American position
in regard to non-recognition of Soviet Russia and entered into diplomatic
relations with the U.S.S.R. Among the agreements which he made with the
Foreign Minister of Russia, now known as the Litvinoff Assignments, was
one for the transfer of the assets of the privately owned Russian insurance
companies located in New York, to the nationalized ownership of the U.S.S.R.
in order to transfer them to the United States for use in settling claims which
the two countries had against each other. The State of New York had con-
sistently refused to recognize collectivization of individual assets of Russian
Nationals, and refused under well-recognized principles of Conflict of Laws,
"U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
5'315 U.S. 203 (1942).
'5301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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to apply a foreign law, offensive to its local public policy. The United States
Supreme Court, in both cases, upheld the agreement between the President
of the United States and the Foreign Minister of Soviet Russia, to override
the policy of the State of New York and to arrange for the transfer of these
New York assets to the agents of the United States for use in balancing
Russlan-American indebtedness.
Thus, there is a belief today, that even the-safeguard of Senate approval
of treaties, found in article II of the Federal Constitution, may be by-passed.
This belief increases the fears of those who have relied on the Tenth Amend.
ment and the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, which Bill of Rights
seems to lack the strength required to stand up in competition with the treaty
power or even the executive agreement.
For the other side, or for the opponents of the Bricker amendment, it
should be pointed out that there is another important case involving the ex-
ecutive agreement which will be considered by the Supreme Court of the
United States within the coming year. 6 It is known as the "Sack of Potatoes"
case, but more properly bears the name of United States v. G. W. Capps &
Co.5" There, an executive agreement with Canada5" permitted the importation
into the United States of seed potatoes from Canada, without regard to the
Agricultural Act of 1948"° under which Congress set up the machinery by
which price supports for American grown potatoes would receive protection,
even to the point of excluding foreign grown potatoes. The Capps Company
brought potatoes into the United States, ostensibly for planting, to conform
to the terms of the executive agreement, but their real purpose was importa-
tion for sale for human consumption. Capps sold the potatoes and the United
States sued Capps for the equivalent of the price which the United States
paid to American growers, under the price support program, for an equal
quantity of potatoes. Lower United States courts,6" in this case, have held that
the executive agreement cannot be used to supersede an act of Congress;
that Capps was not bound by the terms of an agreement which the Executive
was not authorized to make; that there was nothing in the Agricultural Act of
1948 which made illegal the conduct of Capps; therefore, the United States
has no basis for a claim against Capps.
It is quite possible that this case will produce a clear cut statement on
the effect of the executive agreement on prior inconsistent laws of the United
States and perhaps there will be dicta to indicate how the Supreme Court
will treat the executive agreement which conflicts with inconsistent state
"Cert. granted, 74 Sup.Ct. 135, Nov. 16, 1953.
'100 F.Supp. 30 (E.D. Va. 1951), rev'd 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953).
:.U. S. TREATY SEa., No. 1896 (Dep't State).
162 STAT. 1247 (1948).G'See note 57 supra. See also Sutherland, the Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements, and
Imported Potatoes, 67 HAtv. L.R. 281 (1953).
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laws. To date, the Supreme Court has never held that a treaty, ratified by the
Senate, has been in conflict with any other provision of the Federal Consti-
tution. To date, the Supreme Court, has not interfered with the freedom of the
Executive in his agreements with a foreign power. The Capps case may well
resolve any doubts as to whether the executive agreement, may, like a formal
treaty, supersede an earlier act of Congress or an inconsistent state law. If,
(and, of course, there is no way of knowing how the Supreme Court will rule
in the Capps case) the Supreme Court agrees with the lower Federal Courts,
the fear of free-wheeling Executive action which the Bricker amendment, in
its third provision, seeks to curb, will no longer have any foundation in fact.
If the Capps decision favors free-wheeling Executive action which may be
inconsistent with .the expressed intention of Congress in the same area, the
proponents of the Bricker amendment will be armed with a strong new
weapon. Senator Bricker, and those in the Senate who join with him, seem to
be firm in their belief that the Executive Agreement must not be used in lieu
of a Treaty.
It is being said in many places, and it is being said by some of the most
important people in the country, that the Bricker amendment provisions will
hamstring the President in the making of the Executive Agreements. It should
be repeated that the Executive Agreement and a treaty ratified by two-thirds
of the Senate are not synonymous, that they are not treated by Senator Brick-
er as being synonymous, and the restrictions which Senator Bricker proposes
to place upon the Executive Agreement are much stronger than those which
the Senator wishes to place upon the treaty power. The Bricker limitation on
this treaty power seems to be concerned only with the domestic effect of such
treaties. Whether or not the restriction which Senator Bricker wishes to put
upon the power of the Executive in making agreements are any more burden-
some than those which the Supreme Court will say are already imposed upon
the President, if the Supreme Court affirms the Capps case, it is too early to
say. There are many constitutional lawyers who prefer to await the decision
in the Capps case before they take a position on the possible dangerous
effects which may flow from the use of the executive agreement in place of a
treaty. An affirmance of Capps, based on the reasons given by the Court of
Appeals, will hamstring the President in the way that Senator Bricker pro-
poses to do.
As I understand the proposal of Senator Bricker, he wishes to restrict
the treaty power (as distinguished from the executive agreement) in two
ways: (1) To repeal as much of article VI of the Federal Constitution as is
required to prevent a Treaty from becoming self-executing and destructive
of rights guaranteed under the Tenth Amendment. (2) To prevent the Treaty
Power from being used in such a way as to take away from American citizens
rights expressly guaranteed in all other parts of the Federal Constitution and
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threatened, apparently, by the Covenant on Human Rights and the Genocide
Convention. The same propositions are reinforced in a provision of his pro-
posed amendment to prevent the transfer of the rights of American citizens
to an international organization-which probably means that the United
States must not yield to an International Court the adjudication of rights
which, up to now, have been determined in the courts of the United States un-
der the guarantees of the Federal and State Constitutions. Otherwise, no
change appears to be proposed which will impair the power of the President
to make a treaty by and with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate being
present. The external effects of a treaty will remain the same as they are now,
but the internal or domestic application of the treaty will require specific
implementation.
Lawyers are particularly concerned over the possible transfer of the
rights to adjudicate the legal interests of Americans from an American to
an International Court. It is not correct to say that all American lawyers are
opposed to such a transfer for it was an American lawyer who made the
United Nations proposal that there be an International Criminal Court." The
objections raised to such an International, Criminal Court are that there is no
plan for trial by jury; there is no guarantee of a trial in the vicinage; there
is no guarantee of the provisions against self-incrimination found in the
Fifth Amendment, nor is there any guarantee of the rules of evidence or
judicial procedure which Americans call due process of law.
Lawyers are concerned, but to a lesser extent, with a provision in a recent
treaty of friendship between the United States and Israel, which with the
consent of the states, eliminates the requirement of citizenship as a qualifica-
tion on the right to practice law, or to practice any of the learned profes-
sions." There are some lawyers who say that a promise of eligibility to a
California lawyer to practice law in Israel is not exactly the equal of a prom-
ise to a lawyer of Israel that he may qualify to practice in California without
forfeiting his citizenship as an Israeli. Under the most favored nations clauses
in many treaties, ratification of the treaty with Israel will put the non-citizen-
ship provision for professional qualifications in some 40 countries."
There are some lawyers who see in the International Labor Organiza-
tion, with its rules on the qualifications and working, conditions of seamen,
now capable of superseding contrary American laws, a threat to American
self-determination of American problems. There are others in our country
who see an International Organization deciding eligibility for marriage,
eligibility for attendance at public schools, eligibility for ownership of land
"
1See note 2 supra. See also 99 Cong. Rec. 9623 (July 21, 1953).
1229 DEPT. STATE BuLL., 308 (Sept. 7, 1953).
"'See Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931). Batram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116 (1887).
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
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and inheritance, fair employment practices, social security of new and differ-
ent application, equal rights for women, the elimination of the jury, a break
with accepted forms of due process of law-and these others believe that an
International Organization will get the power to act through the use of the
Treaty Power and the Executive Agreement contrary to the wishes of the
majority of American legislators and in violation of other provisions of the
Federal Constitution.
This review of the history of the Treaty Power in the United States and
of the conflicting views of the opponents and the proponents of the Bricker
amendment is offered to help interested citizens to be able better to judge
adequately what course of conduct to follow-if the Bricker amendment is
submitted to the people of California for approval or disapproval.
